HTTP Stalling Detector
HTTP stalling DoS attacks take advantage of an inability for webservers to determine if a remote client is just connected over a slow link or if the remote client is deliberately sending data very slowly to avoid the webserver doing a timeout and shutting down the connection to preserve local system resources. The behavior that is typically seen by attackers is to open a lot of connections a slowly dribble out data to prevent the webserver from timing out the connection. If a webserver is using a smallish worker pool, this resource exhaustion can be easy to reach.
Many modern webservers have become more defensive about these type of resource exhaustion attacks, but it's still prudent to watch for the attacks and it's very plausible that a number of vulnerable web servers are still present in production networks. It's also possible that a webserver might be resistent to one form of the attack and still vulnerable to another. For example, a webserver might be resistent to data being sent slowly in POST body but vulnerable to data being sent slowly in a single HTTP header or multiple HTTP headers. This script is intended to catch the overall notion of data being sent too slowly in any part of the client request and should catch any of these attack styles.
This is easiest to install through the Bro package manager::
bro-pkg refresh bro-pkg install bro/corelight/http-stalling-detector
The output from this script is a pair of notices:
HTTPStalling::Attacker - This indicates that attacker performing an HTTP stalling attack was detected.
HTTPStalling::Victim - This indicates that a particular host was targetted by one or more attackers.
The notices are split into two like this because there is some software to do these attacks that can use proxies to spread out the attackers across many originating IP addresses. The concern is that if a single request is all that ever comes from an IP address, the attack would never be detected. By splitting into attackers and victims, the victim shows up very clearly even in the presence of this type of attempt at obfuscation.
Written by Seth Hall email@example.com